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ABSTRACT
LAISSEZ FAIRE, COLLECTIVE CONTROL OR NATIONALIZATION
OF THE GLOBAL COMMONS
Richard S. Eckaus
The use of the atmosphere as a dumping place for greenhouse
gases has been a matter of laissez faire. Proposals for an in-
ternational agreement to restrict the rate of such emissions are,
in effect, proposals for collectively determined controls. The
alternative proposed here is, "nationalization," which would give
each country a share in the global carrying capacity and allow
each country to determine the timing and best use of its share.
The advantage of nationalization of the global commons is
that it would allow each country to determine its own path toward
its allocated accumulation level, rather than having that path
determined by international negotiations or an international
authority. There is a prima facie case that, in general, coun-
tries can make better decisions for their own welfare than can
international authorities.
The allocation of shares in global carrying capacity accord-
ing to the population size of each country, with debits for pre-
vious accountable emissions would be a means of achieving inter-
national equity. If the allocation were based on populations in
some post World War II year, say, 1950, it would recognize the
fact that most developing countries became responsible for their
own economies only after achieving independence from colonial
rule. This rule would also carry an implicit penalty for high
growth rates of population and emissions since 1950.

R.S. Eckaus
Oct. 6, 1992
I. Introduction
Laissez faire has prevailed in the use of the atmosphere as
a freely available dump for the greenhouse gas emissions that
contribute to global warming, until very recently. The new view,
embodied in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, is that, "something must be done quickly," to control the
rates of greenhouse gas emissions. However, it is not the rates
of emissions which should be the primary focus of policy. The
prior issues are, first, the acceptable atmospheric concentra-
tions of greenhouse gases and resulting climate change and, sec-
ond, the means of governance that will be used to enforce those
ceilings.
The alternative proposed here to international collective
controls administered through the United Nations is the nation-
alization of the decisions with respect to the accumulation of
greenhouse gases through the allocation of shares in the "global
carrying capacity" or "global commons" to individual countries.
This approach, while sharing some of the problems of collective
control, would deal more explicitly and more effectively with the
fundamental resource problems of both efficiency and equity.
In the design of global climate policy, as with other com-
mons problems, it is the commons, itself, that should be the cen-
tral focus of negotiations. This contrasts with the terms of
current analysis and debate and the international negotiations.
It is true that the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change starts with, "the ultimate objective
of...stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmo-
sphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic in-
terference with the climate system." Yet that level is not
specified, nor even referred to again in the document, which
focuses exclusively on controlling rates of emissions. That
maintains the practice of the preceding negotiations which were
carried on in terms of rates of emissions of greenhouse gases. 1
Controlling the rate of emissions is an instrument of
policy, rather than a goal in itself. It is an instrument that
can be used rationally only if the goal, which is control over
world climate change, is clear. Thus, control of emissions rates
should be the second step toward an international policy, not the
first.
It will be assumed in the following discussion that green-
house warming, even if not imminent, is, in fact, a potential
danger. However, it will be necessary to consider at a later
point, the implications for international negotiations and atmo-
spheric governance of the many unresolved scientific un-
certainties. There are also unresolved questions as to what the
social and economic costs would be of imposing reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions. It will also be assumed here, that
1 For example, in the February meeting of the International
Negotiating Committee of the United Nations, Working Group I was
established to, "deal ... with commitments for limiting and
reducing greenhouse gas emissions." (UN Chronicle, XXVIII, (2)
June, 1991, p. 57.)
3these costs and the benefits of avoiding greenhouse warming are
both substantial, otherwise there would hardly be an issue to ne-
gotiate. The nature and implications of uncertainties with
respect to these issues will be considered.
II. The character and use of the "qlobal commons"
The atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and their
global warming consequences depend not only on past emissions,
but also on their atmospheric chemistry, their decay rates and
reabsorption. The term "global carrying capacity", which has
been used rather loosely, can be given a somewhat more precise
definition as a particular feature of these response character-
istics: the maximum atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases consistent with avoidance of significant climate change.
In a rather misleading terminology, which will, nonetheless, be
used, as it has become so universal and is so convenient, it is
also the "global commons". Because of its literal associations,
it must be emphasized that the global commons is not defined
directly, analogously to land area or ocean surface. Rather it
is characterized in terms of the overall relationships between
greenhouse gas concentrations and radiative forcing.
Although the terminology of "commons" is applied to these
complex interactions, it is certainly not a conventional use of
the term and some discussion of it is warranted as the analogies
that it suggests can be misleading. Common property lies between
the extremes of individual ownership and control, on the one
hand, and an asset or feature which belongs to and is controlled
by no one. Historically, "common" property has been owned and
controlled by a particular group, with the rights of the group,
as a whole, and of the individuals using the property being more
or less clearly specified. By comparison, ownership and control
of the response characteristics of the earth, atmosphere and
oceans is not now located in any group, so it is neither common
nor private property.2
The benefits of common property may be more or less un-
limited or finite and "subtractive", so that the greater the use
by one, the less available for others. The latter have been
called, "common pool," resources. 3 The same resource may even
move from one category to the other, depending on the intensity
of its use. That is true, for example, of waterways and high-
ways, for which, at low utilization intensities, an additional
user will hardly reduce the benefits obtained by other users. At
higher use intensities there will be congestion and, possibly,
degradation of the resource.
There is a similar phenomenon with respect to atmospheric
carrying capacity, which provides benefits as a convenient dump
2 There is a modest analytical literature in economics on com-
mon property, most recently associated with the problem of ocean
fisheries management, and, of course, a substantial historical
literature. On the former, see, G.H. Scott, Economic Theory of
A Common Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political
Economy, 63, 1955 and D. Levhari and L. Mirman, "The Great Fish
War," Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 1980.
3 Cited in W. Blomquist and E. Ostron, ""Institutional Capac-
ity and the Resolution of a Commons Dilemma," Policy Studies
Review, 5, (2), 283-293.
5for greenhouse gases. It has a natural regenerative capability,
beyond which greenhouse gases accumulate with potential global
warming effects. As a climate moderating feature, the global
commons provides benefits - or disbenefits - to all, but, as will
be noted, in quite different ways.
The fact that a resource is a common property does not mean
that its benefits will necessarily be distributed equally or eq-
uitably. First of all, the distribution of benefits may have no
connection or only a loose connection with the locus of control,
but, rather, depend on the intrinsic nature of the commons. For
example, the world's whale population has been made into a kind
of common property by international agreement. The benefits from
the controlled hunting of whales depend, in part, however, on
where the whales swim, which cannot be controlled. Secondly, the
differences in the benefits of common property stem,- in large
part, from the need for complementary inputs. Countries with
more ships to catch the whales and farmers with more cows to put
on the village common lands get a larger share of the benefits of
each type of commons.
The developed countries of the world, which have pumped the
overwhelming portion of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere,
have, to date, been the main beneficiaries of its ability to ab-
sorb these gases. This is the source of the argument from some
developing countries that the developed countries should bear
6most of the burden of adjustment to lower emissions of greenhouse
gases. 4
A less clear, but potentially important example of unequal
distribution of the disbenefits or costs of climate change has
its source in the prediction by global climate change models of
substantial differences in the global distribution of air
temperature changes, precipitation changes and soil moisture
changes due to a doubling of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.5
These models project much larger changes in temperature in the
higher northern and southern latitudes than in a wide belt around
the world that encompasses most of the developing countries of
the world. With somewhat less uniformity, the same is true of
projections of soil moisture and, with even less uniformity, of
precipitation. Although there are many uncertainties associated
with such predictions, they suggest that global warming, itself,
would occur to a lesser degree in most developing countries than
to the industrialized countries, although the consequences could
nonetheless, be more severe.
III. Alternative means of managing the global commons
--------------------------------------
4 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
states that, "the largest share of historical and current global
emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed coun-
tries," (p.2) and, "the developed country Parties should take the
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects there-
of," (p.6).
5 J.F.B. Mitchell, S. Manabe, T. Tokioka and V. Meleshko,
"Equilibrium Climate Change," in J. T. Houghton, G.J. Jenkins and
J.J. Ephraums, Climate Change, Cambridge U. Press, N.Y., 1990,
pp. 131-1782.
7The fact that a resource is a common property does not
necessarily dictate a particular method for managing its use.
Common properties may be used within the community on an individ-
ually laissez faire basis, be managed by community controls, in-
cluding the trusteeship of an individual leader, or may be allo-
cated more or less permanently to be used by a particular indi-
vidual or group. Examples of all of these systems can be found,
with laissez faire, perhaps being more exceptional than implied,
for example in Hardin's celebrated article.6
The international negotiations on climate change can be
regarded as an attempt by the world community to convert the
global carrying capacity for greenhouse gases into the common
property of the international community of nations with rules for
its use. Much of the reasoning about global carrying capacity as
a commons has been by analogy with the medieval village commons
lands, to which Hardin made reference. Yet not all types of com-
mons present the same problems in achieving efficient and equita-
ble management. There was, in fact, great variation in the man-
agement of village commons and there is no a priori reason to
believe that the characteristics of medieval village common lands
make any of their administrative practices a model for the man-
agement of the global greenhouse gas carrying capacity. More-
over, although the focus has usually been on efficiency, the his-
------- ---------------------------------
6 G. Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science, 162, 1243-
8.
8torical debate in England over the, "engrossing of the commons,"
was at least as much a debate over equity.
The efficiency "problem of the commons" was presented by
Hardin, and is generally presumed, to arise because a scarce
resource, belonging to all, is treated by individuals, acting
separately and seeking to maximize their own returns, as if it
were available without limits and free. As a result there would
be excessively and inefficiently intensive of the resource. Even
if this was an actual scenario, it would not necessarily imply
the destruction of the commons and, "ruin to all," as has some-
times been argued.7
The remedy conventionally prescribed for over utilization of
common property is "privatization", i.e. conversion of the common
resource to private property whose use would then be determined
by markets. That was part of the rationale for the enclosure of
English commons, that has received so much historical attention.
If the markets were perfect, the uses of the converted private
property would be perfectly efficient, otherwise not.
The analogy for the global commons might be called "nation-
alization" - the allocation of shares in global carrying capacity
to individual countries. Since the global commons is really a
set of characteristic responses to greenhouse gas concentrations,
the prior requirement would be an international agreement on the
7 More rigorously, the argument is that the marginal returns
from the resource will be driven to zero, because as long as
there is some positive marginal return, those with access to the
commons will try to appropriate it.
9atmospheric gas concentrations that would be tolerated. Nation-
alization would mean the determination of the accumulated emis-
sions that each country would be allowed to add to the atmo-
sphere, consistently with the overall targets. Once the alloca-
tion was made, the individual countries would then make their own
decisions as to how and when they would approach their particular
limits.
The analogy is not a precise one for several reasons.
First, countries are not entities that manage their own resources
to maximize profits. Nonetheless, countries assume responsibili-
ty for many aspects of their environment, because of its nature
as a public good. Presumably they exercise this responsibility
in the national interest to maximize their citizen's welfare. To
do this, governments, even though they are not profit maximizers,
should meet the same general type of rules for efficient resource
allocation as private firms, using the tools of social cost-
benefit analysis. 8 Secondly, there are discernible boundaries to
most kinds of property that can make its allocation quite pre-
cise. That is not the case for the global commons, so if it were
nationalized, there would have to be monitoring of its use.
That, in principle, is not different from the monitoring of the
exploitation of oceanic fish and whale populations, which have,
in effect, been converted into common properties. The practical
---------------------------------------
8 This statement of efficiency conditions passes over the many
difficult incentive and administrative issues that would be in-
volved in their achievement.
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in effect, been converted into common properties. The practical
problems would, of course, be quite different.
Collective decisions and collective actions are the other
alternative to laissez faire and seem to have been more common at
the village level, where controls were placed on the use of the
commons by individuals. Both the efficiency and equity of col-
lective action depends on the character and effectiveness of the
rules that are applied collectively. These, in turn, depend, in
part, on the voting procedures that are used.9
The proposals for an international agreement to restrict the
rate of greenhouse gas emissions, country-by-country, are, in ef-
fect, proposals for collective action in the administration of
the global commons. This procedure was only approximated in the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. That was
partly the result of disagreements as to urgency of the need for
any action. Perhaps more important were the differences, which
often remained implicit, with respect to the sharing of the bur-
dens of the consequences of any agreement.
IV. "Nationalization" vs. collective control of the
global commons: logical and practical issues
The choice of approaches should depend on their relative ef-
fectiveness in achieving both efficiency and equity. In princi-
9 There is a substantial literature on voting procedures,
stemming mainly from the seminal work of Kenneth Arrow. The bur-
den of the results is often skeptical. See K.J. Arrow, Social
Choices and Individual Values, Cowles Foundation Monograph,
No.17, New York, Wiley
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ple, the first step in each approach should be a decision on the
extent of climate change to be allowed, perhaps none at all.
That would determine the acceptable target levels of concentra-
tion of greenhouse gases. International equity would depend on
how the targets for the net accumulated emissions of each country
were determined. The achievement of efficiency and domestic wel-
fare would depend on how each country used its share of the
world-wide accumulation target through its annual emissions.
The primary advantage of nationalization is that it would
allow each country to determine its own path toward its allocated
accumulation level, rather than having that path determined by an
international authority. There is a prima facie case that, in
general, countries can make better decisions for their own wel-
fare than can international authorities. 10
It may be argued that the practical difficulties in the na-
tionalization of the global commons are too profound to permit
its implementation. They would, certainly, be the most complex
set of international negotiations ever attempted. The first
logical requirement, the ability to predict the effects on
climate of alternative cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases,
is not fully within the grasp of atmospheric scientists. In the
face of this ignorance, perhaps some maximum target might be set
--------------------------------------------
10 In opposition to this assertion, it might be argued that
countries can be governed by persons who are short-sighted or
corrupt and that the creation of a new property right in the
global commons only creates another opportunity for mistakes and
dishonesty.
provisionally.11 Next, an international consensus would be re-
quired on a tolerable target level of average climate change.
That would certainly be difficult to achieve since it would re-
quire compromises among nations in different regions which would
be affected differently by climate change. Any climate com-
promise could be expected to involve other types of compromise
and, perhaps, economic offsets.
The last step in the negotiations, the distribution among
countries of shares in the associated acceptable level of green-
house gas accumulations would not be less difficult. The dis-
tribution could have a major impact on the economic growth of
each country.
In the face of the limited knowledge and conflicting goals
that would be encountered, shortcuts and logical as well as
political compromises are necessary. By comparison, setting
targets for rates of emissions of greenhouse gases may be the
more straightforward and politically feasible procedure. On the
other hand, it is certainly a dangerous tactic to dismiss a more
fundamental, though more complex, approach to an international
problem. There are many examples of undesirable, even disastrous
consequences of foregoing rationality and equity in international
as well as domestic policy. The ferment and destruction that
11 It should be recognized that there is no special scientific,
political or economic status to the doubling of current or 1990
concentration levels, a benchmark often used in making projec-
tions.
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have resulted from the creation of arbitrary national boundaries
provides an obvious and dramatic example. Moreover, even if the
attempt is made to confine the debate to acceptable rates of
emissions and avoid the issues of allocation of the global com-
mons, it will, finally, not be possible. The national interests
of the developing countries will not permit it. The real issues
cannot be avoided.
Scientific difficulties in setting atmospheric
concentration goals
While the fundamentals of greenhouse warming processes are
well known, aspects that are too important to be called, "mere
details," remain uncertain. It is impossible to establish
empirical relationships because the temporal evidence is too
short, and, perhaps, too uncertain to provide a guide. The
theoretical relationships are also uncertain. The current global
climate models which provide the currently available predictions,
at best give long run equilibrium solutions while the path toward
that equilibrium is of central importance. At worst, there are
scientific criticisms of the models which create misgivings.
There are still unresolved questions as to what happens to
the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, how they interact and
even, for example, how long they persist. The roles of the ocean
and land masses, in absorbing carbon dioxide and in regulating
heat changes, are also not fully understood. There is, moreover,
a major discrepancy between estimates of the amounts of carbon
14
dioxide generated and the amounts that can be accounted for in
the atmosphere. 12
The existence of these scientific uncertainties means that,
while the concept of the response characteristics of the atmo-
sphere, the oceans, and characteristics of the earth's soil and
biomass may be clear, their measurement is somewhat ambiguous.
That, in turn, means that the allocation of quotas in the "global
carrying capacity" or the "global commons" cannot be done with
the kind of precision that would be desired for policy.
By comparison, it may seem relatively straightforward to
make an agreement that would set ceilings on the rates of emis-
sions of the major greenhouse gases. The appearance belies the
reality. The essential issue is the radiative forcing of
climate, which is determined by the response characteristics of
the atmosphere. Thus, the scientific uncertainties that create
difficulties in allocating quotas in the global commons also im-
pede the setting of emissions standards.
Difficulties in the economic analysis of the effects of global
warming and of restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions
Policies toward social and economic change should be set
taking into account all of the resulting gains and losses. The
benefits of amelioration of climate change by reducing greenhouse
gas emissions should be set against their costs. Yet, there is
-----------------------------------------
12 See R.T. Watson, et al, "Greenhouse Gases and Aerosols," in
J. T. Houghton, G.J. Jenkins and J.J. Ephraums, Climate Change,
Cambridge U. Press, N.Y., 1990, pp. 131-1782.
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no simple relation between economic activity, greenhouse gas
emissions and net contribution to radiative forcing for any
single country. There are many potential choices among alterna-
tive compositions of output, of fuels and of technologies that
generate emissions. While there has been progress in the analy-
sis of the economic costs of restricting carbon dioxide emis-
sions, the analyses are far from definitive. There has, in addi-
tion, been only one attempt to extend the analysis to other
greenhouse gases and that includes only methane.
Even by comparison, relatively little has been learned about
the costs of climate change - which would be the benefits of
avoiding such change. There have been some overall attempts at
quantification, but these are, frankly, speculative and the more
solidly grounded work is quite limited in scope.
Finally, there are great differences among countries in nat-
ural resources, capital stocks, education levels, technologies
and standards of living. Thus, there is no reason to expect that
the relations between economic activity and greenhouse gas emis-
sions are the same for every country. Each country, if given a
quota of the global carrying capacity, could be expected to make
somewhat different choices of its own rate of usage or annual
emissions rate.
SSuppose that, instead of controlling emissions rates, each
country were given a quota of total accumulated emissions as a
share of the worldwide allowable emissions. Then, the less de-
veloped countries of the world, relatively impoverished and with
16
relatively large unutilized quotas might well decide to increase
their rate of use of their allocated global carrying capacity and
their emissions rates for a long time. Tere might also be sales
or leases of emissions "rights" among countries. Developing
countries can be expected to have some unused quota which they
could sell or lease. Industrialized countries wanting to avoid
drastic adjustments brought on by sharp reductions in emissions
would be on the buying or renting side. The terms on which the
emissions rights exchange would depend on the type of emission
and on the demand and supply conditions that generated the emis-
sions. For example, methane's atmospheric lifetime has been
estimated at 10 years and carbon dioxide's at 50 to 200 years. 13
An industrialized country using a relatively large amount of nat-
ural gas, whose production and use releases methane into the at-
mosphere, might want to make a deal for a quota for methane emis-
sions. A country more dependent on coal and petroleum might
propose deals on carbon monoxide emissions.
There have been attempts to define Global Warming Potential
as a relatively simple physical concept that could be the basis
for trade in emissions rights. This is bound to fail as there
can be no solely physical index of the economic consequences of
greenhouse gas emissions. When emissions of a particular gas be-
come binding constraints, the economic opportunity costs imposed
13 R.T. Watson, op.cit., p.7.
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by the constraints will, in general, be different from period to
period as well as different from country to country.14
There are studies that claim a great deal can be achieved by
improvements in efficiency in the use of fuels, with the net
result of fewer emissions and improved economic performance.15
There are also studies that conclude that, with only modest tech-
nological improvements, the costs of adjustment to lower emis-
sions will be relatively small, for the U.S. and, presumably, for
other, generally similar industrialized countries.16 On the
other hand, there are results that indicate the welfare costs of
adjustment to much lower emissions rates will be quite large, at
least for developing countries.17 These latter results are
plausible because adjustment is more difficult in developing
countries than in the industrialized countries. So the imposi-
tion of an additional constraint, in the form of emissions
restrictions, may well have a more severe impact.
-----------------------------------------
14 See, for example, Daniel A. Lashof and Dilip R. Ahuja, "Rela-
tive contributions of greenhouse gas emissions to global warm-
ing," Nature, 344, 5 April, 1990, pp. 529-531 and R.S. Eckaus,
"Comparing The Effects of Greenhouse Gas Emissions on Global
Warming," The Enery Journal, 13(1), 25-35.
15 See Committee on Science, Engineering and Public Policy,
National Academy of Sciences, et al, Policy Implications of
Greenhouse Warming, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.,
1991, Chap. 6.
16 Jorgenson, Dale and Wilcoxen, "Environmental Regulation and
U.S. Economic Growth," presented at the MIT Workshop on Energy
and Environmental Modeling, July 31-Aug.1,1989.
17 Blitzer, Charles R., Eckaus, Richard S., Lahiri, Supriya and
Meeraus, Alex, "A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Effects of
Carbon Emission Restrictions on Economic Growth in A Developing
Country," Center for Energy Policy Research, MIT, January, 1990
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It might be argued that all the differences among countries
that would lead to differences in preferred emissions rates could
be taken into account, even if the international negotiations
were confined to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. To do that
in a carefully discriminating manner, however, the negotiators
would, themselves, have to do what the individual countries would
do if given their share of the global carrying capacity. That
is, they would have to work out the intricate relationships be-
tween the economic conditions and growth prospects for each coun-
try and rates of greenhouse gas emissions. There is no escape
from those linkages.
Political difficulties in setting atmospheric concentration goals
It is a superficial and incorrect argument that, because the
problem of global warming is global, there are common interests
in controlling it. Because of the regional differences in its
effects and of differences among countries in the impact of emis-
sions constraints, there will be differences in the interest of
countries in moderating global warming. The histories, the cur-
rent conditions and the prospective futures of each country in-
volved in the negotiations are quite different and the differ-
ences are relevant to their negotiating positions. Some coun-
tries are poor now and some are rich and that affects their rela-
tive current and desired future rates of use of the global commons.
A point that has already been made forcefully by representa-
tives of developing countries is that most of the greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere with anthropogenic sources have been
19
pumped there by the industrialized countries in the course of
their own development. These countries, it is argued, therefore
have a greater responsibility to constrain their emissions. An
implication of this type of argument is that there are quotas for
greenhouse gas emissions and that the industrialized countries
have already used a substantial part of their allocation.
The interests of the developing countries of the world will
continue to impel them to pose these arguments, directly or in-
directly, obscurely or unequivocally, as to the relative rights
of the industrialized and developing countries to discharge
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, i.e., the allocation of
rights to the global carrying capacity. Thus a focus on rates of
emissions will not permit an escape from the essential problem of
setting an overall greenhouse gas accumulation target and dis-
tributing shares among countries.
Viability of international agreements to constrain emissions
Suppose an international agreement were signed committing
each country to limit its greenhouse gas emissions. That, it-
self, would not guarantee compliance, largely because, in the ab-
sence of some form of coercion, the gains and losses from com-
pliance and noncompliance are as quite unequal. Small emitters,
rich or poor, may believe that they can have any benefits of gen-
eral emissions constraints without actually constraining their
own 'emissions. For small emitters, violation of an international
agreement to limit emissions will hardly affect the final outcome
in terms of the accumulation of greenhouse gas emissions. This
20
expected behavior is a version of the "free rider" problem, well-
known in economics.
For poor countries, whether large or small, the benefits of
violation of an international agreement restraining emissions, in
terms of increased growth, may well be regarded as outweighing
the longer term harm in larger contributions to radiative forc-
ing. For countries that are both large and poor, violations may
lead to discernible differences in greenhouse gas accumula-
tions.18
With these expectations of noncompliance, monitoring and
coercion will be necessary to enforce any agreements. Robert
Wade in his discussion of the skepticism of Mancur Olson on col-
lective action to manage common assets 19 comments on this point:
Where Olson and other pessimists about col-
lective action are surely right is in the
need for coercion to back up agreements.
Their emphasis on the difficulties of
voluntary collective action is a useful
counter to the simple optimism of those who
18 There are various simple games that can be constructed to
illustrate the point in which rich and poor and large and small
countries "play" against each other. It is important to note in
constructing these games that the greenhouse gas emissions of
large and small countries and rich and poor countries will be of
quite different magnitudes and, or, have different payoffs.
They, will, therefore, have different consequences for possible
eventual greenhouse warming.
19 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard U. Press,
Cambridge, Ma., 1971.
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believe that community development projects,
people's participation, water users' associa-
tions, and the like are mainly a matter of
teaching people about their real common in-
terests or promoting values that are less in-
dividualistic.20
This can expected to be true on an international scale as well.
Monitoring, of the major sources of emissions, would not be
as difficult a task as, say, monitoring of nuclear missiles, for
nearly every significant source must be out in the open. None-
theless a large scale effort would be required. Domestic produc-
tion and international trade statistics will provide essential
information on country fuel balances, which will indicate sources
of greenhouse gas emissions. There may have to be on-site in-
spections or, possibly, inspection by orbiting satellites and a
cadre of analysts counting acres of paddy and thermal electric
stations.
Because of the differences in the scale of emissions of
large and small countries, it might be argued that monitoring and
enforcement should be limited to only the few large countries
whose policies would have a discernible impact. On the other
hand, for the purposes of international equity and domestic pub-
lic support, the large countries will want to reduce the
prevalence of "free riding" on the part of smaller countries.
20 op.cit., p. 229.
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For the purposes of coercion, there are a number of instruments,
most important of which might be access to international trade
and finance. Invocation of coercive instruments would certainly
require prior international monitoring.
What could be done about countries that become "bankrupt"
with respect to their greenhouse gas emissions quota. First of
all, "bankruptcy" would have to be identified by monitoring and
comparison with the country's program of intended emissions. If
it were identified, procedures could be used that are analogous
to the treatment of countries that cannot meet their internation-
al financial obligations. That is, the country would be con-
strained to follow an agreed upon plan to reduce their emissions
rates to come into conformance. To enforce these restrictions
the international community would have to have agreed beforehand
on the kinds of coercion that it would bring to bear, if neces-
sary.
IV. How should the rights to the global commons be allocated?
There are two aspects to this issue: how can the shares in
the global commons be allocated and how should prior omissions be
debited against these shares. These are thorny issues, but even
if they are sidestepped and left implicit, rather than faced
openly, after the fact, there will inevitably be an analysis to
determine what the tacit agreement was.
The following represent some of the major possibilities,
and, in practice, they might be combined:
(1) allocation of future quotas on a per capita
23
basis, with debits for past emissions,
(2) allocation of future quotas on a per capita
basis, with the rule for past emissions that "bygones
are bygones",
(3) allocation of future quotas with adjustments so that
they vary inversely in relation to per capita income,
(4) allocation of future quotas with adjustments so that
they vary inversely with deviations from a specified
"poverty level" of per capita income,
(5) allocation of future quotas with the rule that
no country's per capita income level should
be reduced as a consequence.
The first alternative, is, perhaps, the most instantly ap-
pealing but would face significant objections. If accepted, the
resulting distribution would become a limiting constraint on the
economies of the developed countries most quickly. As a result
it could be expected that they would put forward all kinds of op-
posing arguments, some of which would not be entirely self-
serving.
The richer countries might assert that they should not be
penalized by the fact that, due to the process of growth, itself,
or, as a result of their culture and mores, they had limited
their population growth rates, while the poorer countries had
not. They might also argue that their advancement has and will
contribute indirectly and directly to the advancement of the
poorer countries. There are senses in which that is true, but,
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on second thought, considering the reactions that might be
provoked from previous colonies, perhaps the more judicious deci-
sion would be to avoid the proposition. Some might also argue
that future generations should be considered in any distribution
of commons. It is, after all, not so difficult to make reasonab-
ly good population projections. The argument would certainly be
opposed on the grounds that it encouraged population growth.
The developed countries may also contend that, "bygones are
bygones," since those emissions occurred in innocence of what
their potential climatological effects might be. and, thus, that
every country should stand on an equal basis (somehow defined) in
the approaching international negotiations. Yet the developed
countries are benefiting from the actions of the past that have,
in effect, appropriated part of the atmospheric carrying capac-
ity. In this relevant sense, bygones are not bygones.
The allocation of quotas in inverse proportion to achieved
per capital income levels would be a rough way of recognizing the
differential contributions of the various countries to the exist-
ing stocks of greenhouse gases with anthropogenic origins. If
the allocations were made in proportion to deviations from some
poverty level, that would mitigate the effects on the industrial-
ized countries.
The last of the rules would be a kind of compromise position
that would also contain incentives for the industrialized coun-
tries to reduce their emissions rates in relation to their
achieved levels of income and output.
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Economists, like other specialists, resort to what they know
about and it comes to mind to ask whether there are any Pareto
optimal allocations, i.e., allocations that will make at least
one country better off, without making any worse off. It must be
the case that some decision on an allocation is better than none
at all, which could result in global warming for all. A theorem
enunciated by Prof. Ronald Coase of Chicago University, may ap-
pear to address the present issue.2 1 The theorem says that, even
where there are externalities, economic efficiency can be
achieved by assigning "rights" to the externality, whatever the
distribution of the rights. That is the argument for nation-
alization or collective control, rather than anarchy, in the use
of the global commons. Beyond this point, the theorem lacks
relevance for two reasons. First, it does not address issues of
equity and there would certainly be distributional consequences
among countries of different distributions of emissions quotas.
That is, each possible distribution will have implications for
each country's achievable levels of output and income. Perhaps
those can be submerged in a general euphoria about "doing some-
thing", but it is doubtful.
Second, the theorem requires the existence of perfect, or
anyway pretty good markets. If markets, including international
markets for goods and finance, were perfect, there would be dif-
ferent patterns of development than we now observe.
21 R.H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law
and Economics, 3, 1-44.
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There will be no easy answers or answers based on universal-
ly accepted principles to the quota allocation problems. The
outcome will have to be some kind of political compromise. It
will be difficult, if not impossible, to gain general interna-
tional acceptance for any rule that appears to value people in
different countries differently. That implies some version of
the first rule of allocation by population, with debits for pre-
vious accountable emissions.
Any amendments to this rule would have to meet a "fairness"
test. One such amendment would base the allocation on popula-
tions in some post World War II year, say, 1950 would meet some
of the issues raised in the other rules on the list. It would
recognize that most of the developing countries became responsi-
ble for their own economies only after achieving independence
from colonial rule and that, for all of them, their "big push"
toward development came after World War II. However, it would
also contain an implicit penalty for high population growth rates
since 1950. The choice of a year at which to begin counting
cumulative emissions to debit against the original allocations
would provide also provide scope for compromise.
VII. Conclusions
There are grand issues at stake, with scientific, economic
and political questions closely intertwined. International nego-
tiations can be successful only if they contribute to a better
understanding of these issues and address the fundamental issues.
Fortunately, the negotiations are not a zero sum game. If the
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global warming phenomenon is real, all Countries will stand to
gain from arriving at an agreement, although to different de-
grees. As in other negotiations of this sort, the final agree-
ment will be a compromise with variability in the extent of the
gains.
Where internal politics is not compelling, it can be ex-
pected that some countries will opt to delay agreements until the
gains and losses can be determined with more accuracy than is now
possible. This, apparently, has been the U.S. position. With
modest and specialized exceptions, the Green movements in the de-
veloping countries have little political influence, as compared
to the European countries, in particular. That will make it
easier for them, also, to delay agreement. In such circum-
stances, they will have to be "bought out" or threatened by the
industrialized countries that want to restrict emissions.
The role of developing countries will be crucial. Their in-
terests go in the direction of rational decision making, which is
to make the allocation of shares the center of attention. They
can also argue their case on economic efficiency grounds. Ar-
bitrary levels of emissions restrictions will create more econom-
ic damage than allowing countries free choice in their inter-
temporal distribution of their emissions.
